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Abstract
Adequate housing and affordable warmth are essential human needs,the lack
of which may seriously harm people’s health.Germany provides an allowance
to low-income households, covering the housing as well as the space heating
cost,to protect people from the consequences of poor housing conditions and
fuel poverty. In order to limit public expenditures, payment recipients are re-
quired to choose low-cost dwellings,with the consequence that they probably
occupy flats with a poor thermal performance. Recipients are thus likely to
have a higher energy consumption and energy expenditures. Using a large
data set of German households,this paper demonstrates that this counteract-
ing effect is of negligible magnitude. Yet, from an ecological perspective, the
allowance scheme creates distorted incentives and should be reformed.
JEL Classification:C33,H53,Q48
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Housing is an essential human need, one that not only impacts spiritual and
material well-being but also health (Cattaneo et al. 2009, Thomson et al. 2001).
People spend a considerable share of their income for housing, and an integral
part of decent housing are suﬃciently warm rooms. Consequently, expenses for
space heating comprise a substantial share of the energy budget of people living
in moderate or cold climates.
In the face of rising energy prices in recent years, the notion of fuel poverty –
the struggle of low-income households to obtain aﬀordable warmth – has become
popular in political discussions. Such households typically live in rented accom-
modations and have little incentive to invest in the thermal eﬃciency of property
they do not own. Hence, they have little option but to pay the higher energy
cost.
Following Bradshaw and Hutton (1983), fuel poverty can be mitigated by an
increase of income or a reduction of energy expenditures. Policy usually provides
some mixture of ﬁnancial assistance to tackle the challenge of energy poverty.
For instance, France, Italy, Belgium and Spain provide special energy tariﬀs that
reduce the energy price for low-income residents (EPEE 2008a, 2008b). Germany
provides a housing allowance to households reliant on social assistance payment
(SAP), which is designed to permit SAP recipients to choose a dwelling of the
lower rental price segment, and additionally covers the entire energy expenses for
space heating. The annual public spending amounts to more than e12 billion
(ARGE 2008, 2009).
The theoretical implications of this program are highly controversial. Rather
than giving recipients incentives to save energy and thereby reduce their expen-
ditures, the allowance program sends the opposite price signal as it essentially
lowers the price for space heating to nil. Moreover, since only low-cost dwellings
are covered by the program, it is very likely that the respective ﬂats in turn
4exhibit a low energy eﬃciency. Beneﬁciaries of the allowance may thus con-
sume considerably more energy for space heating than households outside the
program. This gives rise to a counteracting eﬀect: the enlarged energy expendi-
tures for SAP recipients may even outbalance the imposed limitations on their
rent spending. Other undesirable implications also arise from this counteract-
ing eﬀect: a higher consumption of space heating fuels like natural gas and fuel
oil yields higher carbon-dioxide emissions and contradicts the climate protection
strategy of the German government. Further, the possible escalated energy con-
sumption of welfare recipients intensiﬁes Germany’s dependency on fossil fuels –
ironically ﬁnanced by public spending.
Though the principal mechanics underlying the counteracting eﬀect might
raise concerns about the design of the German housing allowance program, it
is an open empirical question as to whether the magnitude of this eﬀect is large
enough to be of political and practical importance. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst paper that aims at assessing this eﬀect. We proceed by reviewing
some details of the German housing allowance program in section 2. Section 3
describes the data and methodology and provides subsequently the empirical
results. Section 4 ﬁnally concludes.
2 Germany’s Housing Allowance Program:
Framework and Implications
People who are either long-term unemployed or are unable to participate on
the labor market are entitled to receive a SAP to cover their daily expenses,
as long as the respective household’s income is below a certain threshold. A
housing allowance is also provided following the extensive redesign of the SAP at
the beginning of 2005. The allowance is designed to permit eligible households
to occupy a dwelling of the lower rental price segment, and covers their rent
5and space heating expenditures. Almost 3 million households – nearly 8% of
all households in Germany (ARGE 2008:55) – have received beneﬁts from the
allowance program in 2007, yielding program expenses of e12.5 billion.
About 90% of the recipients were tenant households, for whom the program
framework deﬁnes the maximal admissible dwelling size according to the house-
hold’s size, and limits the maximal rental price per square meter living space,
depending on the price level of the respective municipality. If the actual rent
expenditures exceed the permissable amount, the program authority usually pro-
vides a grace time of six months in which the recipient is required to move to a
cheaper dwelling, and pays thereafter only the permissable amount.
To pursue the implications of the program framework more formally, we de-
lineate household i as living in location k, and compute its per-square meter rent








where R and E denote rent and energy expenditures, respectively; Q denotes i’s
living space, and pk refers to the price for energy at location k.
Let w denote an allowance receiving household. While people are generally
free to choose any dwelling they can aﬀord, the allowance program requires from
their recipients that rwl < ¯ rl, with ¯ rl being the market average rent in location
l. Thus, dwellings priced above the average rent can only be occupied by non-
recipients, and program participants should therefore posses on average a smaller








Unlike rent expenditures, the allowance program also covers the actual energy
expenditures for space heating. Nevertheless, no clear-cut ex-ante criterion exists
to appraise the appropriate amount of energy costs to be covered, as these costs
are triggered e.g. by climatic eﬀects. While it is generally intuitive that low-cost
6dwellings are not endowed with up-to-date and energy-eﬃcient equipment, the
concept of hedonic prices and the implications of what is known as ﬁltering the-
oretically suggest that the dwelling’s rent is linked to its amenities, including its
energy eﬃciency. Hedonic prices refer to the characteristics approach by Lan-
caster (1966), where the product price is a composition of the individual prices of
the product’s attributes. Given that quality and energy eﬃciency are attributes
of a speciﬁc dwelling, poor quality and an inferior energy eﬃciency is thought
to be associated with a low rent. Filtering refers to the successive shift of the
dwelling’s occupation from high- to low-income households during its life cycle: as
the building ages and deteriorates, it becomes less expensive and more aﬀordable
to households with lower income. Filtering thereby implies that the building’s
quality – deﬁned for instance as technical obsolescence of the heating equipment –
is correlated with the building’s age (Lowry 1960, Weicher and Thibodeau 1988),
and entails that low-income households live in dwellings at the lower tail of the
quality distribution.1
Along the lines of hedonic prices and ﬁltering we expect that allowance recip-








Since local climatic conditions trigger diﬀerences in energy consumption, e is
normalized by local heating degree days (HDD), a measure for the local heating
requirement.2 While equation (2) denotes that allowance program participants
will presumably pay a comparably lower rent per square meter, conditional on
the local rental price level, equation (3) implies that they have in turn a higher
energy consumption for space heating and thus higher energy cost, conditional
on the local energy price level and the local climate conditions. The inverse
1A strong association between income and the thermal performance was observed by Santa-
mouris et al. (2007), who combined the socioeconomic background of surveyed Greek house-
holds with information on the insulation standard of their occupied dwelling.
2The calculation of HDD is described in the appendix.
7directions of the inequality signs depict the counteracting eﬀect inherent in the
housing allowance program. While it is unclear whether and to what extent this




The housing allowance program was established at the beginning of 2005 and
aﬀects almost exclusively tenant households. We hence restrict our attention to
tenant households and draw data from the German Socioeconomic Panel, a rep-
resentative longitudinal study of private households in Germany. Our data set
includes 5 988 tenant households for the years 2005 and 2006 and is structured
as an unbalanced panel: we observe 1 010 households exclusively in 2005, 603
households exclusively in 2006, and 4 375 households in both years. Sublets are
excluded from the data because of diﬃculties separating out their energy expen-
ditures from those of the main-tenant. The oﬃcial welfare statistics shows that
recipient-households consisting of only a single person often share their accom-
modation with other persons (ARGE 2008). This group of recipients is therefore
somewhat less frequently observed in our data set compared to the population.3
The data set contains information on the household’s rent and space heat-
ing expenditures in e, the occupied dwelling space in m2, a dummy indicating
whether the household has received welfare, and a location identiﬁer at the county
level. Using this location information, we supplement the household data with the
local heating degree days (HDD), the price in e-Cent/kWh for natural gas from
the local utility, and the average rent for average dwellings (in e/m2) within the
3Following ARGE (2008), about 48% of all welfare receiving households consist of a single
person. Of these, about 12% share their accommodation.
8Table 1: Sample Average Statistics
2005 2006
Welfare No Welfare Welfare No Welfare
Observations∗ 650 4 469 638 4 071
Living Space (m2) 66 73 67 73
Monthly Rent Expenditures∗∗
total (e) 366 450 366 456
per m2 (e/m2) 5.62 6.30 5.62 6.33
Monthly Energy Expenditures
total (e) 7 27 78 28 4
per m2 (e/m2) 1.12 1.09 1.25 1.16
2005 2006
Gas Price (Cent/kWh) 5.58 6.57
Heating Degree Days (HDD) 3 606 3 449
Average Rent∗∗ (e/m2) 5.20 5.24
∗The sample consist of 9 828 observations, but due to the panel structure we observe 5 988 sepa-
rate households. ∗∗The monthly rent expenditures include the dwelling’s service and operating
cost (e.g. trash removal). The average rent is free of these cost.
respective county, and conditional on the sample year. Details on the assembly
of these regional data are given in the appendix.
Table 1 denotes sample statistics of all variables used in the analysis. The
upper panel outlines household speciﬁc information, and the lower panel summa-
rizes variables speciﬁc for a county. As expected, welfare recipients indeed exhibit
a lower rent but higher space heating expenditures per square meter. However,
the expenditure diﬀerences per square meter are rather small between the groups.
T-tests suggest a statistically signiﬁcant higher average spending on energy per
square meter for welfare recipients in 2006, while no signiﬁcant diﬀerence arises
for 2005.4 This mixed ﬁnding for the sample years might be due to the sharp
rise of energy prices between the two years, since higher energy prices emphasize
existing diﬀerences in the dwelling’s energy eﬃciency.
4The t-statistic for the per-square-meter energy expenditures for the year 2006 is 2.8, while
t =1 .2 for 2005. Respective tests for the per-square-meter rent suggest signiﬁcant lower
expenditures for welfare recipients in both years, with t =6 .63 (2006) and t =7 .17 (2005).
93.2 Model Speciﬁcation
The econometric analysis also incorporates the local climate conditions and the
local prices for rent and energy, and proceeds with the following very general
two-equation structure:
yRit = αR +x x x 
Ritβ β βR + uit, (4a)
yEit = αE +x x x 
Eitβ β βE + vit, (4b)
to examine the diﬀerences in rent and energy expenditures between welfare-
receiving households and non-recipients. We refer to (4a) as the rent expenditure
equation and denote (4b) as the energy expenditure equation. The vectors x x xRit
and x x xEit contain the respective covariates, and αR and αE are the respective
constant terms of the equations.
For every household we observe both equations jointly, and we observe most
of the households in both sample years. The regression residuals uit and vit
might therefore possess household-individual aspects and are likely to be corre-
lated across equations and – given the panel structure of our data set – might
also be correlated across the sample years. To address this feature we use a
maximum-likelihood version of Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) model. The used model – described in Gould et al. (2003:229-239) –
captures intragroup correlation by clustering all observations coming from the
same household. The computed robust (Huber-White) standard errors relax the
assumption of independent observations but only require independence between
households.
10We pursue two diﬀerent model speciﬁcations for equation (4):
Model 1:
yRit = ln(Rit) x x x 
Rit =

ln(Qit) ln(¯ rt) Wit

yEit = ln(Eit) x x x 
Eit =

ln(Qit) ln(pt) ln(HDDt) Wit

Model 2:
yRit = Rit x x x 
Rit =

Qit ¯ rt Wit QitWit

yEit = Eit x x x 
Eit =





Model 1 is speciﬁed in log-log form, meaning that the coeﬃcient for the loga-
rithm of the household’s living space Qit, for example, can be interpreted as the
percentage change of rent expenditures if the living space increases by 1%. The
same elasticity interpretation applies for the parameters of the log of the local
natural gas price p, the log of the local average rent ¯ r, and the log of the local
climate variable HDD. The binary variable Wit equals one if the household i re-
ceives welfare at time t ∈{ 2005,2006}, and is zero otherwise. The parameters for
Wit capture any percentage diﬀerence in rent and energy expenditures between
the two groups of households that cannot be attributed to the other covariates,
including quality eﬀects due to substandard dwellings.
Model 2 gathers the diﬀerences in rent and energy expenses between wel-
fare recipients and non-recipients via the welfare dummy and an interaction of
the welfare dummy with the household’s living space. We keep this as the only
meaningful interaction, since welfare-speciﬁc slope parameters for the local aver-
age rent, the local gas price, or the weather appear implausible. Possible nonlin-
ear eﬀects of local climate variation on space heating expenditures are captured
by including HDD and squared HDD into the energy expenditure equation of
model 2.5
5A nonlinear relationship between climate and the household’s energy consumption was found,
for instance, by Gr¨ osche (2009) for US households.
11The counteractive incentives in the housing allowance program imply a neg-
ative sign for the welfare coeﬃcients in the rent expenditure equations of both
models, and a positive signs in the energy expenditure equations, respectively.
3.3 Parameter Estimates
The results for model 1 are depicted in the upper panel of table 2; the lower
panel shows the results for model 2. The respective ﬁrst two columns refer to the
estimated coeﬃcients and the robust standard errors of the rent equation, while
the last two columns report the results for the energy expenditure equation. The
last row of each panel reports Wald test statistics, clearly indicating the superior
ﬁt of the speciﬁcation compared to a constant-only model.
Both models basically tell the same story. Each additional square meter of
living space increases the rent spending by on average e5.64, a value consistent
with the average per-square meter rent reported in table 1. Also, the average
energy expenditures raise by e0.92 per additional square meter. The elasticity
estimates of model 1 suggest that rent and energy spending will increase with a
lower rate than living space, a plausible ﬁnding in line with the market observation
in Germany, where smaller apartments typically exhibit a comparably larger per-
square-meter price.
As expected, rent and energy cost are both positively correlated to its re-
spective local price level, stressing the importance of accounting for diﬀerences in
average rent and the local energy prices in the analysis. Living in a location with
an average rent e1 above the “overall mean rent” yields increasing housing ex-
penditures of some e67, a ﬁgure corresponding to the average dwelling size given
in table 1. In turn, raising the gas price by one cent per kWh would increase the
monthly space heating expenditures on average by e4. The elasticity estimates
of model 1 show that the short-term response to such a market price increase is
inelastic.
12Table 2: Results SUR Models






ln(Living Space) 0.858∗∗ 0.019 0.837∗∗ 0.022
ln(Avr. Rent) 0.760∗∗ 0.035
ln(Gas Price) 0.361∗∗ 0.072
ln(HDD) −0.112 0.066
Welfare −0.092∗∗ 0.014 0.038 0.019
Constant 1.150∗∗ 0.104 0.997 0.547
Wald-Test χ2(df = 3) = 2427 χ2(df = 4) = 1541






Living Space 5.640∗∗ 0.211 0.920∗∗ 0.032
Avr. Rent 67.561∗∗ 4.000
Gas Price 3.994∗∗ 0.748
HDD −0.010 0.016
HDD2 (×10−5)0 .122 0.213
Welfare 49.852∗ 21.753 8.383 5.277
Welfare × Living Space −1.315∗∗ 0.350 −0.092 0.081
Constant −312.612∗∗ 27.882 8.029 29.919
Wald-Test χ2(df = 4) = 1195 χ2(df = 6) = 940
∗∗(∗) signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) level
While the parameters for the welfare dummies exhibit the expected signs
in both models, only those in the rent equations are statistically signiﬁcant.6
But even beyond statistical signiﬁcance one can generally question whether the
counteracting eﬀect is of practical and political importance, since our results
indicate that the ﬁnancial oﬀset is of limited scope. For instance, the estimated
coeﬃcients of model 1 suggest that welfare recipients exhibit a 9% lower rent but
in turn spend 4% more on energy. The descriptive statistics in table 1 clarify that
the level of rent expenditures, to which the 9% diﬀerence refer, is well above the
6In light of the sharp rise of energy prices in 2005 and 2006 we checked the robustness of our
results by estimating all models conditional on the respective sample year. The outcomes of
this exercise show the same pattern like table 2 and thus conﬁrm our ﬁndings.
13level of monthly energy cost. By means of the results of model 2, we can compute
for the average allowance recipient from 2006 a rent expenditure diﬀerence of e38,
while the associated rise in energy expenditures amount to only e2. Thus, even
if the observed energy expenditure diﬀerences would be statistically signiﬁcant,
the oﬀsetting eﬀect would be of small magnitude.
Finally, neither of the coeﬃcients for the climate variables are statistically
signiﬁcant. However, one should not infer that weather has no impact on the
space heating demand. The ﬁnding simply suggests that the variation of HDD in
Germany (regional and across the years) is not large enough to denote signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in space heating demand.
4 Summary and Conclusion
About 3 million households in Germany receive social assistance from a housing
allowance program. The program covers the cost of housing and space heating
for welfare recipients, and yielded program expenses of more than e12 billion
in 2007. By requiring that the rent of beneﬁciaries be low, the program design
may result in a high energy consumption of recipients, meaning high energy cost
for the public. This paper has empirically assessed the scope of this eﬀect. Our
results show that recipients have indeed comparably lower rent spending, but we
found no convincing evidence for a substantially higher energy consumption.
Notwithstanding our ﬁndings, one can question the incentive structure inher-
ent in the allowance program. Currently, the program does not provide any stimu-
lus to the beneﬁciaries for saving energy but subsidizes their energy consumption.
Although improved energy eﬃciency of the building stock is a key political goal
of the German government, the program yet provides an opposite market signal
as it sustains a permanent demand for low-cost/low-quality dwellings. Landlords
serving this demand have actually no incentive to retroﬁt their property. To the
contrary, a retroﬁt will usually raise the dwellings’s rent, and the home might
14become too expensive to be covered by the allowance program.
In summary, although the program design obviously limits public expen-
ditures, the current design perpetuates the emissions of greenhouse gases and
thereby contradicts Germany’s climate protection eﬀorts.
5 Appendix: Data Assembly of Regional Data
To compute the household’s heating degree days (HDD) we make use of temper-
ature data, metered by a grid of 140 weather stations from Germany’s National
Meteorological Service.7 Subsequently, the HDD are calculated as the diﬀerence
between 20◦C indoor temperature and the daily average outdoor temperature
below 20◦C, summed over all days of a year for which the average outdoor tem-
perature is below 12◦C. To obtain overlapping coverage of the weather data with
household locations, we use a Geographic Information System (GIS) and spatially
interpolate the metered temperature to the household locations.
The majority of dwellings in Germany are heated with natural gas. We thus
approximate the local energy price pk with the average end-user price of natural
gas, charged by the utilities operating in the respective county and including
the standing charge for the gas meter. Because the provided utility data denote
prices of August 2008, the data are discounted using an energy price index to
obtain prices of 2005 and 2006, respectively.8
For many of the household locations we lack observed data for the respective
average rent. To proceed, we impute this ﬁgure via a two-step procedure. In the
ﬁrst step, we regress observed average rent of 325 German cities from 167 counties
on a set of county-speciﬁc variables. Using the estimation results, predicted values
7Deutscher Wetterdienst, for more information see http://www.dwd.de.
8The cost data are provided by the internet database http://www.verivox.de for a household
consuming 20,000 kWh natural gas per year and include the annual standing charge for the gas
meter. Dividing the total cost by the consumption ﬁgure yields the average price in e/kWh.
The German Federal Statistical Oﬃce publishes a gas price index of 100 for 2005, this value
rises to 117.6 for 2006, and amounts to 131.6 for August 2008 (StaBuA 2008:27-28).
15Table 3: Imputation of Average Rent
Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Population Density 0.442∗∗ 0.125
Population Density2 −0.014 0.041
Income Tax −7.015∗ 3.489
Income Tax2 26.479∗∗ 5.764
Living Space −0.513∗∗ 0.185
Living Space2 0.006∗∗ 0.002
East 0.397 0.249
Constant 14.856∗∗ 3.614
N = 325,F(7,317) = 66.43, adj. R2 =0 .59
∗∗(∗) indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% (5%) level,
Population Density is measured in 1000 inhabitants/km2,
Income Tax is measured in 1000 e/inhabitant.
of average rent for all 440 Germany counties are derived in the second step. The
model estimated in the ﬁrst-stage:
(5) ¯ rk = γ +z z z
 
kδ,
includes a vector z z zk of county covariates, whose elements are: the population
density (measured in 1000 people per km2) to proxy the urban condition of the
considered city, the available living space per inhabitant (in m2), a dummy indi-
cating whether the city is located in eastern Germany, and the average amount
of income tax per inhabitant (in e1000/inhabitant) to proxy the relative wealth
of the considered city. To allow for possible non-linearities, all variables except
the east dummy enter in quadratic terms.
Table 3 reports the estimated coeﬃcients along with their standard errors. As
expected, a higher population density goes hand in hand with a rising average
rent, suggesting that – ceteribus paribus – a comparable dwelling is more costly
in larger cities. The income tax occurrence has a u-shaped relationship to the
average rent, with its minimum at a level 132 e per inhabitant. Beyond that
level, meaning the inhabitants become more wealthy, the living space becomes
16more expensive as well. The coeﬃcients for available living space suggest likewise
a convex relationship to the average rent, with a minimum at 42.75 m2 per
inhabitant. However, a closer inspection of the data from the 325 cities reveal,
that 90% of the observations lie below this minimum, suggesting the expected
negative correlation between available living space and average rent. Finally,
the east dummy does not appear to be signiﬁcant, an unsurprising ﬁnding after
having controlled for many county-speciﬁc circumstances.
Finally, the average rent of all 440 German counties is imputed using the
estimates from table 3 and the county speciﬁc elements of the vector z z z.
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